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14. ABSTRACT As a nation at war, facing a diverse set of new challenges, the stakes are high and are growing for the United States. The nation needs to expand its “operationalization” of the national fleet and ensure the Coast Guard and Navy work together to most effectively utilize multi-mission assets. An enhanced national fleet along with international engagement in pursuit of the “1,000 ship Navy” is the most critical enabling force for securing the maritime domain. The purpose of this research paper is to present the Coast Guard Caribbean Support Tender (CST) model which is a key and quintessential element for building international partnership and the Thousand-Ship Navy. It provides a Combatant Commander with an economically viable, diplomatically acceptable, and operationally proven solution to employ in order to increase regional stability and build partnerships. Finally, it concludes with a view on how the Coast Guard multi-mission capabilities and international partnerships make it ideal to contribute in realizing the vision of a Thousand-ship Navy. Given the likelihood that some of the future naval conflicts will occur in the littoral vice open ocean, The Coast Guard’s unique skills must be capitalized upon and fully utilized.					
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“Good For The Goose, Good For The Gander;”
A Coast Guard Model For The Thousand-Ship Navy

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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ABSTRACT

As a nation at war, facing a diverse set of new challenges, the stakes are high and are growing for the United States. The nation needs to expand its “operationalization” of the national fleet and ensure the Coast Guard and Navy work together to most effectively utilize multi-mission assets. An enhanced national fleet along with international engagement in pursuit of the “1,000 ship Navy” is the most critical enabling force for securing the maritime domain.

The purpose of this research paper is to present the Coast Guard Caribbean Support Tender (CST) model which is a key and quintessential element for building international partnership and the Thousand-Ship Navy. It provides a Combatant Commander with an economically viable, diplomatically acceptable, and operationally proven solution to employ in order to increase regional stability and build partnerships. Finally, it concludes with a view on how the Coast Guard multi-mission capabilities and international partnerships make it ideal to contribute in realizing the vision of a Thousand-ship Navy. Given the likelihood that some of the future naval conflicts will occur in the littoral vice open ocean, The Coast Guard’s unique skills must be capitalized upon and fully utilized.

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INTRODUCTION

Preserving the freedom of the seas is a historic and ongoing national priority. The right of vessels to travel freely in international waters, engage in innocent and transit passage, and access ports is an essential element of national security. The freedom of the seas and waterways is also global freedom, that ensures the smooth operation of the world's economy.¹ It is a matter of safety and security as much as commerce.

The attacks of 11 September 2001 infused the U.S. partnership with allies with a greater sense of urgency, as well as the need to re-examine the structure of the partnerships and collaboration. Many strategists agree that the U.S. must build and maintain a global maritime security network with willing coalition partners and allies that give all allied nations the domain awareness capable of generating intelligence to successfully prosecute and defend against terrorism.² America's national maritime fleet, the combined Navy and Coast Guard ships, must be more than a collection of assets or platforms. It must be a dynamic functional reality that is part of a truly "global maritime network."³

¹ Ivan Luke, DOD's Role in Maritime Homeland Defense and Security, NWC 3148, (Newport, RI.: U.S. Naval War College, August 2006), 12.

² Admiral Thad Allen and Admiral Mike Mullen, "America's National Fleet: A Coast Guard-Navy Imperative," *Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute*, August 2006, 16. As the war on terrorism continues, a special friendship continues to flourish between the Navy and Coast Guard. Both services understand the need to stand together in naval and maritime matters while building allied partners to confront the challenges ahead of maritime domain awareness.

³ John Morgan Jr. and Charles Martoglio, "The 1,000 ship Navy Global Maritime Network," *Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute*, November 2005, 14.

The difficulty is in how to best accomplish this daunting task, especially in the current global security context. The current proposed solution and the ensuing strategy is that of a thousand-ship coalition fleet. The thesis of this essay is that The Coast Guard Caribbean Support Tender (CST) is a key and model to building international partnership and unity in pursuit of the thousand-ship navy.

The National Defense Strategy outlines an active layered approach to the defense of the nation and its interests of which maritime strategy is one component. The President and this strategy promote close cooperation with others around the world who are committed to the same goals. Concurrently, in the current strategy, we must deepen cooperation with the maritime forces of strategic partners as well as emerging partner nations. This will enhance their capabilities to provide for their own as well as the collective maritime security.

As a nation at war, facing a diverse set of new challenges, the stakes are high and are growing for the United States. The nation needs to expand its “operationalization” of the national fleet and ensure the Coast Guard and Navy work together to most effectively utilize multi-mission assets. An enhanced national fleet along with international engagement in pursuit of the “1,000-ship Navy” is the most critical enabling force for securing the maritime domain. ⁴

⁴ Thad Allen and Mike Mullen, “America’s National Fleet: A Coast Guard-Navy Imperative,” *Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute*, August 2006, 18.

Why a 1,000-ship Navy? These are dynamic times. The maritime security environment is constantly changing and U.S. strategy forces, and strategic documents must change with them as necessary to remain relevant. It is a continuous cycle that requires a new strategy for the current century. Admiral Michael G. Mullen clearly captured this need declaring:

Where the old maritime strategy focused on sea control, the new one must recognize that the economic tide of all nations rises, not when the seas are controlled by one, but rather when they are made safe and free for all. Today, the globalization of the world economy is truly an engine of hope for our children for all people. ⁵

In part, it is the interlocking of economic and security that necessitates that a naval approach for the 21st Century.

Leaders must consistently develop innovative ways to further national security. The “1,000-ship Navy” concept acknowledges that globalization has created economic and security interdependencies between nations, and that no nation can act alone since the policing and protecting of the maritime commons is in the collective interest of all nations. A global maritime network of willing international navies will be required to ensure the maritime commons are safe and free for the use of all. ⁶

The National Security for Maritime Security states that, the safety and economic security of the United States depends upon the secure use of the world’s oceans and maritime security is best achieved by blending public and

⁵ Michael Mullen, Current Strategy Forum, Naval War College, 14 June 2006

⁶ Michael Mullen, and Michael W. Hague, Navy & Marine Corps, Memorandum of Understanding, January 2006.

private maritime security activities on a global scale into an integrated effort that addresses all maritime threats.⁷

UP CLOSE AND PERSONAL

There is no substitute for face-to-face communications with allied nations in leveraging the bond of the sea. By investing in and building this valuable relationship, partner navies are uniquely well placed to secure the growth of world economies and the spread of democracy while, at the same time, deterring those who threaten them. On receiving the Department of State's 2002 George Schultz Service Award, then Coast Guard Commandant Admiral James Loy, stated, "Once you lock the doors and windows and install alarm systems for your house, you need an effective neighborhood watch to promote security. Building the neighborhood watch should be a top national priority."⁸

The ability to understand the culture of our partner nations and build stronger relations is essential to building the future Navy. Three of the last five roadmaps called for by the current QDR are building partnership capacity, strategic communications, and intelligence.⁹ The U.S. cannot achieve its defense objectives alone. The concept of active, layered defense must include international partners. Thus, among the key goals of the

⁷ *The National Security for Maritime Security for the United States*, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, September 2005), ii.

⁸ Cited in Joe M. Vojvodich, "Building an Effective Neighborhood Watch in the Caribbean," *Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute*, March 2004, 68.

⁹ John Morgan Jr. and Charles Martoglio, "The 1,000 ship Navy Global Maritime Network," *Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute*, November 2005, 14.

National Security Strategy, is that of working with other nations to resolve regional crises and conflicts.¹⁰

International Navies and Coast Guards routinely conduct the full range of operations: SAR, law enforcement, marine environment protection, disaster response and security operations. Due to the U.S. Coast Guard's size and multi-mission capabilities, it is well suited as a model upon which smaller nations can build their maritime forces. Numerous CNOs of foreign navies have advised Admiral Mullen of their desire to build partnerships from the "bottom up." Links with the Coast Guard has figured prominently into Admiral Mullen's maritime strategy and force posture. The Coast Guard offers a unique capability and tool in successfully developing a worldwide maritime network. It also can provide one unique operational example of international maritime cooperation. The Caribbean Support Tender (CST) concept is one model to consider. Caribbean leaders have spoken out on this concept as a successful global maritime network.

The CST provided a training platform unlike any other in the U.S. military inventory. This model is an effective means of nation building and international outreach that the U.S. Navy and the nation needs to use in developing a thousand-ship Navy and successful international partnerships.

The CST model can have significant operational and strategic success. The CST was a multi-national venture that fostered cooperation and

¹⁰ President, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington, D.C.: 16 March 2006), 14.

improved the operational capabilities of the maritime services of the Caribbean. Although the program was disestablished in 2006, due to financial constraints of SOUTHCOM, Department of State and Coast Guard, its value as an operational and strategic concept was not questioned and its success were frequently noted. The CST was an integral part of the efforts of the Coast Guard in forging strong links between the maritime services of partner nations in the Caribbean Basin. The extension of these links promoted strong and efficient partnerships capable of combating the threat of terrorism, illegal drugs and migrants throughout the United States.

The CST concept was created in response to the 10 May 1997 Caribbean/US Summit in Bridgetown, Barbados. At that meeting, President Clinton made a commitment to support international to Caribbean nations who requested this unique partnership with the Coast Guard. In response, the U.S. Coast Guard responded by re-commissioning USCGC GENTIAN on 27 September 1999 in Miami, Florida. USCGC GENTIAN was built in 1942 and represented the *only* U.S. vessel dedicated to international engagement and strengthening partnering nations' maritime interdiction capabilities.

The CST program was originally established to support development of Caribbean countries' maritime service capability. The Coast Guard believed the Caribbean international support tender would create a strong partnership, enhance maritime interdiction, and increase international

cooperation amongst nations. It quickly expanded to include nations of Central America and the northern portion of South America.

The CST mission was to improve the operational capabilities of Caribbean and Latin American maritime services to a sustainable level, so they can operate effectively with U.S. forces and conduct mutually beneficial operations. It specifically addressed mobile maritime support, exercise participation, professional training, maintenance assistance, logistics, spare parts support, and platform service for disaster relief operations.

The CST crew consisted of forty-three U.S. Coast Guard officers and enlisted personnel, augmented by sixteen international crewmembers from seven participating countries. These international crewmembers served one-to-two year tours. International billets aboard the cutter offered unique underway training opportunities providing valuable experiences easily transferred into the respective maritime organizations.

RESULTS AS GOOD AS GOLD

The accomplishments of the Caribbean Support Tender program and the success it enjoyed in nation building are enormous. In its history, CST completed more than 155 country visits, and provided training and maintenance support to 23 individual countries, (up from the original 15 countries established in 1997), hosted 5,500 international students and graduated 80 international crewmembers who advanced to increased responsibility and high leadership positions upon return to their host nations.

Admiral Thad W. Allen stated, “these nation building engagements greatly advanced the Coast Guard and the nation's strategic objectives.” ¹¹

Additionally, the Caribbean Support Tender rendered crucial support to the Haitian Coast Guard, delivered fourteen refurbished “go-fast” boats, provided \$4 million in spare parts and brought regional maritime services together to conduct various patrol boat conferences and gatherings known as “round-ups.” Round-ups are official meetings where ships from various nations meet in the same seaport and conduct a series of meetings, training sessions and social functions while sharing operational lessons learned. Round-ups proved to be an extremely valuable tool and were designed to bring in vessels from neighboring countries to share best practices, check vessel maintenance and participate in exercises. These events provided an excellent venue for maritime services to demonstrate esprit de corps while fostering regional cohesion and stability. ¹²

For a relatively modest annual fund outlay, it supported the Theater Engagement Policies of the U.S. Coast Guard, Department of State, and U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). The Caribbean Support Tender significantly contributed to U.S. Coast Guard operational objectives, COCOM Theater Strategic Cooperation goals, and the development of force-multiplying partners. Excluding U.S. Coast Guard crew members’ salaries, costs associated with running all aspects of the Caribbean Support Tender

¹¹ Thad Allen, official message to Atlantic Area and CST, R 231615Z JUN 06, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters Washington DC//G-C//, 1

¹² Interview conducted with Willie Wolter, CDR, USCG, Atlantic Area Operations, 18 September 2006.

was roughly \$8M per fiscal year. The Caribbean Support Tender's accomplishments are impressive and provide a huge operational and strategic return on investment for the relatively short timeframe and amount of resources expended.

OPERATIONAL AND STRATIGIC BENEFITS

The CST program had far-reaching benefits that should be considered for future operations and force development. Most significant among them are training, security, and diplomacy. Training was specially tailored for each country to meet the needs, skills, and capabilities of the partner nation. International as well as U.S. crewmembers jointly provided the training during port visits.

Developing seamanship skills at sea, that have a direct benefit to shared and similar missions and current operations, is critically important. For example, refueling at sea (RAS) significantly improves the effectiveness of patrol boats. While this is routinely accomplished in the U.S. Navy, the CST model demonstrated its visibility for smaller navies. Underway mock boardings reinforced competencies that are required of boarding team members in near-real scenarios. Training in detection, tracking and monitoring of maritime narco-terrorism produced many narcotics seizures and enhanced collaborative efforts.

The multi-national personnel training and development provided to the embarked foreign officers in the CST was vital in sustaining

competencies and partnerships. Upon return to their respective countries, officers consistently filled critical leadership and technical billets, enjoying considerable prestige and advantage within their own service from the training received in the CST. The officers quickly became influential leaders within their respective services enhancing all levels of future engagements as they assume greater service and national leadership roles. For example, Captain Edmundo Felix, the former Director of Operations of the Dominican Republic Navy stated, “the training was unmatched and produced extremely competent sailors and my sharpest sea going officers.”¹³

The CST program provided for the planning, coordination, and conducting of eight Maritime roundups (MRU) throughout the Caribbean and Latin America. MRUs promoted regional interoperability and provided a rare opportunity for the maritime services of up to six neighboring countries to come together, within the host country, for a week to ten days of training, exercises and camaraderie. This also leveraged CST’s training capabilities as time which would be lost in transit between the attending countries, was better used training all of the countries militaries together. MRUs also facilitated underway exercises, engineering maintenance, and technical assistance. Ultimately, MRU’s develop cooperation and force multiplication

¹³ Interview conducted with Captain Edmundo Felix, Naval War College, 10 October 2006. Captain Edmundo Felix was the director of Operation, Dominican Republic Navy before reporting to the Naval War College and oversaw all of the maritime forces. LT Cespedes of the Dominican Republic, who served as an international crewmember on the CST, worked under Captain Edmundo Felix’s command and is now the Commanding Officer of the SIRIUS, a 110 foot Swift Boat of the Dominican Coast Guard and a top performer.

within a region and enable follow-on coordinated operations and information networks. All of this was led by the CST.

The second far-reaching area of engagement is security where the CST “Go-Fast Refurbishment Program” made an immediate impact on participating nation’s maritime capabilities. Participating nations throughout the Caribbean Basin routinely reused seized or abandoned “go-fast” boats. In this program, the CST transported the disabled “go-fasts” to the United States for repair and refurbishment in Miami at a CST-contracted facility.¹⁴ Upon repair, CST returned the refurbished “go-fast” for counter narco-terrorism and associated operations. In the case of a hull that is substantially intact, the CST converts sturdy go-fast hulls by recycling them into capable patrol assets without transporting the boat out of the country. The finished product is a completely renewed vessel ready for operation and capable of interoperability. Ultimately, the drug runners’ vessel of choice is improved and then operated by Caribbean and Latin America nations against them.

¹⁴ The refurbishment includes the addition of a permanent 500-gallon fuel tank, canopy and coxswain seat, basic electronics such as VHF radios, integrated radar and GPS units, sirens, and hailers. This work is completed for approximately a third of the cost of a similarly equipped brand-new boat. Mr. Ed Seda, Industrial Manager of Coast Guard Integrated Support Command Miami, instituted the refurbishment program and oversaw installation of new designs before deploying the boats in theater. Strict standards are adhered to before the platform passes inspection of final work and returned to theater.

In recent years, more than four tons of cocaine has been seized by participating nations using refurbished go-fasts.¹⁵ Admiral Thad Allen stated,

“The CST go-fast refurbishment program converted 16 seized go- fast boats with sturdy hulls into capable assets for Caribbean and South American countries. in turn, these capable assets have aided in narcotics seizures and in interdiction of armed narcotics and migrant traffickers. The training and assets the CST delivered will greatly assist these countries in protecting their territorial seas and in the enforcement of laws and treaties.”¹⁶

Through this program, CST enhanced regional maritime strategy.

The third far-reaching benefit of the CST is the stellar performance and reputation it enjoyed in its mission of diplomacy. The CST model has the collateral benefit and ability to be utilized for various types of diplomacy while providing embassy officials valuable opportunities to interact with their counterparts during port calls. The CST created additional access to the leaders of partner countries armed forces for Military Group (MILGP) personnel assigned to U.S. embassies. The CST became a way for the MILGP to demonstrate U.S. commitment to building a strong partnership at the military-to-military level. For MILGP personnel, a CST visit provided a unique opportunity, a reason, even an excuse to work with their counterparts. Similar venues are provided to U.S. ambassadors. CST brings U.S. sovereignty to a foreign country, in which many ambassadors will

¹⁵ Vice Admiral Peterman’s speech as presiding official during the decommissioning ceremony of USCGC GENTIAN in June 2006.

¹⁶ Thad Allen, official message to Atlantic Area and CST, R 231615Z JUN 06, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters Washington DC//G-C//, 1.

advance U.S. interests by gathering the key players in the country's public, private and military sectors by hosting aboard the CST. For example, during a visit to Guyana, the Ambassador hosted a relaxed evening social in CST attended by the Guyanese President, Prime Minister, and opposition party leader; an unprecedented gathering fully noted by the local press.

Some of the many other benefits provided by CST include: seamanship, damage control, fire fighting, medical first responder, maritime law enforcement, outboard repair, general electronics, electrical and mechanical repairs, preventive maintenance, communications procedures, and navigation. For SOUTHCOM, the Caribbean Support Tender was the primary instrument, and the only maritime platform, for execution of the Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP). Additionally, The CST was the U.S. maritime representative for SOUTHCOM's annual Exercise TRADEWINDS involving twenty-three nations.¹⁷ Admiral Allen stated, "supporting the CST program have greatly enhanced national strategic objectives and allowed Caribbean nations to become more capable maritime partners."¹⁸

¹⁷ Through classroom and hands-on training, both on the pier and underway, instruction was given in boat handling, damage control, engineering maintenance, seamanship, search and rescue, and law enforcement. The Caribbean Support Tender conducted over 140 country visits and trained over 5,000 foreign military members within 23 participating countries consisting of Antigua, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Colombia, Costa Rica, Curacao, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, St. Kitts, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago and Venezuela.

¹⁸ Official message traffic to Atlantic Area and the CST, R 231615Z JUN 06, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters Washington DC//G-C// upon decommissioning of USCG GENTIAN.

EXPANDING THE SPHERE OF INFLUENCE

The CST model worked in the Caribbean Basin and Latin America could be utilized in other strategic geopolitical regions as well. One area of operation where the CST would make an immediate impact is along the east and west coasts of Africa. Building African navies and coast guards along the coastline would not only raise their readiness but also their ability to increase and execute missions while building consensus. African navies and coast guards could pool their resources by having assets patrol the coastline enforcing all of the nations' coast lines.

Predicting the future security environment is a difficult. However, many nations are already challenged by a series of common threats.¹⁹ President Bush outlined his updated National Security Strategy at West Point in June 2002 and stated, "We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent."²⁰ Since it is likely that much future maritime conflict will occur in the littoral, the Coast Guard models are ideally suited to respond to aspects such as crises and to train and develop partner nations to be ready to respond.

¹⁹ John Morgan Jr. and Charles Martoglio, "The 1,000 ship Navy Global Maritime Network," *Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute*, November 2005, 14.

²⁰ President, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington, D.C.: 16 March 2006), 1.

The U.S. Coast Guard can act as an instrument of national power to meet the diplomatic, economic, and military missions, thereby increasing regional stability and enhancing Combatant Commander effectiveness. It does so by balancing domestic and international needs, and to preserve its relevance, the Coast Guard's unique skills sets must be continually capitalized on and maintained.²¹ Nations welcome the Coast Guard's multi-mission approach and especially this training and have frequently inquired into the logistics of scheduling it. Personal discussions and interviews with senior officers of respective nations have confirmed the admiration of the U.S. Coast Guard's CST and the high demand they express in getting such a program to visit their respective country.²² This opportunity offered the U.S. a unique leadership opportunity.

CST can enhance emerging partner nation's capabilities to provide for own maritime security by realizing that different regions have different needs and tailoring them to the country. Several other potential areas for operational and strategic success are Central America, West Africa, East Africa and South East Asia and the Philippines. It is an operational model and activity that provides operational and strategic benefits.

ROCKS AND SHOALS

²¹ James Hull, Cari Thomas, and Joe Dizenzo, "What was the Coast Guard doing in Iraq?" *Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute*, August 2003, 38-40.

²² Interview with Captain Eric Jayakody, Srilanka Navy on 30 September 2006 and CDR Ilyes Belal, Tunisia Navy on 13 October 2006 both confirm the high desire for interaction and training provided by the U.S. Coast Guard. Captain Jayakody is working with his government to formally request a visit from the U.S. Coast Guard international training team in 2007.

Realizing the thousand-ship navy and unity within it is a daunting task and utilizing the CST program as part of the solution is not without risk and costs. Indeed, the fact that the U.S. Coast Guard discontinued the program due to the aging of the CST platform and budgetary constraints is evidence of the enormous challenge of making the thousand-ship navy and unity within it a reality.

There are three challenges to overcome in standing up the CST model: identifying appropriate functional platforms, staffing the CST with personnel, and identifying the start-up funds. First, a suitable platform that will last for a sustained period should be selected. There are some units available but not all of them meet the requirements of the CST mission such as having a crane onboard to hoist and load cargo. The possibility of a pre-existing platform exists as some options include a USCG Cutter, a leased vessel, a cutter of opportunity, a USN CST-like alternative or a new acquisition. Regardless of which course of action is selected, close scrutiny will be required to ensure that the unit will perform to standard. The decision is split, as some suggest, the USNS TAGOS class ships would work well while others are proponents of new construction specifically designed for the international mission. If new construction is selected as the desired course, then further time delays will exist in order to allow for development of proper design and construction. Although this will add a significant amount

of time to commissioning vessels, the new CST will surely have an extended life.

Second, staffing the CST with an international crew presents logistics challenges in reaching out to various international partners to provide sailors. The coordination will take considerable time to re-start the assignment rotations that the Coast Guard originally established and ran so well. However, if it is not a Coast Guard mission, it will take even longer to re-establish if for example, the Navy would assume this mission and possibly even longer yet if assumed by a partner nation. Another consideration is that many countries will compete for these positions so management of expectations is required by the host service.

Finally, identifying the proper source of funding, type of money and the right amount of funds is essential. The CST budget will need to have a recurring budget. If the budget is supported by each of the previous three stakeholders, SOUTHCOM, Coast Guard, and Department of State, then coordination with the different agencies will present a challenge and require significant effort to finalize. The potential for agencies to back out of funding their share of the program exists as previously experienced and proved to be the down fall of the previous CST in 2006.

CONCLUSION: THE BITTER END

Because much of future naval conflict may be in the littoral versus open ocean, the Coast Guard's multi-mission capabilities and international

partnerships provide a good model for the Navy to utilize in international outreach for achieving unity in the thousand-ship navy.

The CST Model was an ideal nation-building and partnership model and a classic example of how the Coast Guard was able to use its multi-mission force to provide a non-redundant capability and complement the Navy in support of U.S. goals and interests in a littoral area. Working with international allies, friends and regional organizations, the United States can achieve its thousand-ship navy. In the example, of the CST, there is a model from the past that can be used to achieve the goals for the future. It is economically viable, diplomatically acceptable, and operationally proven.

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